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RECENT CASES
BONDS - UNITED STATES BONDS - REGULATIONS DESCRIBING SOLE METHOD
-OF TRANSFER. - Decedent had purchased United States Liberty Bonds and
registered them in her nephew's name. She retained possession of them until
her death. The nephew, petitioner herein, demanded the bonds from the
-executrix of the estate, and upon her refusal to give them up, brought this
action to compel her to do so. The executrix contended that because of lack
of delivery and acceptance, the decedent had never made a .complete and
effective gift of the bonds. The court held, that whether or not there had been
a valid inter vivos gift, the treasury regulations' providing that the registered
owner of the bonds was the sole owner required that they be awarded to the
-petitioner. In Re Christie's Estate, 130 N.Y. S. 2d 650 (Suff. Ct., 1954).
Regulations of the type involved here, if made pursuant to a valid Con-
gressional Act, have the force and effect of law. 2 These bonds are construed
as a contract between the United States Government and the purchaser and
all rights of the parties arise solely from this contract, of which the pertinent
regulations form a part. 3 This view, that savings bonds can be transferred only
by the methods prescribed by treasury regulations, is representative of that
of the majority of the courts. 4 An oft-cited Kentucky case stated that to allow
outright gifts of the bonds was contrary to treasury regulations controlling
the transferability of the bonds and would open the door to evasion of plain-
ly expressed restrictions on transfers. 5
Those courts following the minority view contend that the treasury regula-
tions do not prohibit a transfer of the bonds by gift, 6 despite the fact that the
regulations applicable to these bonds state that they are transferable only by
authorized reissue except in case of disability or death of the owner, and that
no judicial proceedings will be recognized if they would give effect to an at-
tempted voluntary transfer inter vivos of the bond.7 It is interesting to note
that among the courts which follow the minority view some of them prohibit
the gift gift inter vivos but allow the gift causa mortis, sttaing that it falls
within the exception in the regulations relating to disability or death of the
owner.
8
1. 31 Code Fed. Begs. §306.4 (1949).
2. 55 Stat. 31 (1941), as amended, 31 U.S.C. 757e (1945).
3. United States v. Dauphin Deposit Co., 50 F. Supp. 73 (M.D. Pa., 1943).
4. Lee v. Anderson, 70 Ariz. 208, 218 P.2d 732 (1950); Connell v. Bauer, 61
N.W.2d 177 (Minn., 1953); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Tezyk, 140 N.J.Eq. 474, 55
A.2d 26 (1947); In re Nettle's Estate, 276 App. Div. 929, 94 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1950);
In re Owen's Estate, 177 Misc. 1006, 32 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1941); Collins v. Jordan
et al., 110 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio, 1949); Brown v. Vinson, 188 Tenn. 120, 216 S.W.2d
748 (1949).
5. See Moore's Admin'r. v. Marshall, 302 Ky. 729, 196 S.W.2d 369, 372 (1946).
6. Marshall v. Felker, 156 Fla. 476, 23 So.2d 555 (1945) (held that the war
savings bonds were the subject of a valid gift inter vivos and that the treasury regula-
tions did not mean that such a transfer was unlawful.
7. 31 Code Fed. Begs. § 315.11 (1949). "Not Transferable. Savings bonds are not
transferable and are payable only to the owners named thereon, except in case of the
disability or death of the owner, authorized reissue, or as otherwise specifically provided
in this subpart, but in any event only in accordance with the provisions of the regula-
tions in this part." 31 Code Fed. Begs. *315.13 (1949. "Judicial Proceedings. (a)
No such proceedings will be recognized if they would give effect to an attempted vol-
untary transfer inter vivos of the bond or would defeat or impair the rights of survivor-
ship conferred by the regulations in this part upon a surviving co-owner or beneficiary."
8. In re Borchard's Estate, 179 Misc. 456, 38 N.Y.S.2d. 987 (1942); Dietzen v.
American Trust & Banking Co., 175 Tenn. 49, 131 S.W.2d 69, 72 (1939).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Somewhat analogous to the instant case is a recent North Dakota decision,
Littlelohn v. County Judge, Pembina County.0 One co-owner had made a
gift inter vivos of the bonds to the other co-owner. Upon the death; of the
donor a question arose as to the taxability of the bonds as part of his estate.
The court decided that there was no interest remaining in the deceased, since
his interest in the bonds had vested in the donee upon completion of the gift.
However, if the donee had died first it seems improbable that the bonds
would have gone to her estate rather than to the donor, since applicable reg-
ultations provide that the registration of the name of the owner is the sole
evidence of the ownership and payment by the government is to be made
only to the other registered owner.10 Thus, the case patently departs from
the majority view.
The purpose for which these bonds were first issued was to aid war financing.
The Uriited States Treasury Department set up regulations over the acquisi-
tion, use and disposition of these bonds in an attempt to keep litigation in-
volving these bonds at a minimum. In doing so they made these bonds a
special and unique type of property; they did not fall in any known property
category and yet had features of many different types of property. In dealing
with these bonds, it is well to keep in mind the aim with which they were
issued.
GENE KRUGER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - REVOCATION OF LICENSE AS DE-
PRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS. - Appellant, a physician and a member of the
executive board of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, was convicted
in a federal court of contempt of Congress for failing to produce before the
House Committee on Un-American Activities certain subpoenaed papers rela-
tive to the activities of the Anti-Fascist Committee.' Subsequent to affirmance
of this conviction,2 and after having served five months in jail as a conse-
quence, appellant's license to practice medicine was suspended for six months
by the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York pursuant
to the provisions of the New York State Education Law.3 Appellant sought
a review of the determination of the Board, contending, inter alia, that the
sections of the Education Law under which disciplinary action had been taken
against him were violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Court held, that the conviction be affirmed. When a determination
of an administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence, due process
does not require review of the exercise of its discretionary power. Barsky v.
Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, 74 S. Ct. 650
(1954).
Regultaion of physicians by the state has existed at least since Hammurabi
(B.C. 2285-2242), King of Babylon compiled his famous Code embodying
9. 58 N.W. 2d 278 (N.D., 1953).
10. 31 Code Fed. Regs. §315.45(c) (1949).
1. United States v. Barsky, 72 F.Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1947).
2. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948), certiorari denied, 334
U.S. 843 (1948), rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 971 (1950).
3. 5 6514, subd. 2 (b): "2. The license of registration of a practitioner of medi-
cine . . . may be revoked, suspended, or annulled . . . after due hearing in any of
the following cases: (a) . . . (b) That a physician . . . has been convicted in a court
of competent jurisdiction, either within or without this state, of a crime; .... "
